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Abstract
It is common to hear the argument that poor labour market performance in OECD countries in
recent years is the result of shifts in relative demand against less-skilled workers.  But, there is
much dispute  about whether these trends have been occurring and, if they have, how important they
are in quantitative terms.  In part these problems come from the absence of a clear conceptual
framework in which to think about these issues.  In this paper we propose such a framework and
a measure of skill mismatch that is independent of the definitions of skill, and demonstrate using
data from a number of countries how it can be used to assess the importance in skill-biassed
change in understanding labour market changes in recent years.  Our findings suggest that while
increased skill mismatch does seem to have occurred in the US and UK, it has not occurred in the
other European countries in our sample.  
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Introduction
It is common in some circles to argue that the problems of labour market performance in the OECD
countries have been caused primarily by shifts in relative demand against the less-skilled  (see for
example OECD, 1994; or Krugman, 1994).  Yet others have questioned whether this is really a
plausible explanation (see for example, Card, Kramarz and Lemieux, 1994; Nickell and Bell,
1995; or Jackman et al, 1996).  These studies typically examine how the relative fortunes of high
and low skill individuals have evolved over time and compare these relative fortunes across
countries.  Education is probably the most commonly used measure of skill but others have been
used e.g. the wage in Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1994).  
Although the basic data used in these papers is much the same, the way in which it is used
and the conclusions drawn are often quite different.  For example, Krugman (1994) points to the
larger rise in unemployment rates for the unskilled in Europe, while Nickell and Bell (1995) point
out that relative unemployment rates by skill show similar trends across countries and the OECD
(1994) look at trends in relative unemployment rates by quartile in the skill distribution.  The
existing literature does not provide very clear guidance on what evidence should be given most
weight and it is difficult to know quite what to make of these disparate pieces of evidence.  One
contribution of this paper is to present a conceptual framework which can be used to provide
guidance as to the way in which one should analyse the basic data.  It is doubtful if this paper will
be the final word on the subject but it does have the virtue of making clear the assumptions on
which the analysis is based.
One of the more serious concerns about the existing papers in this area is that a lot rests
on the assumption that levels of education are comparable both across countries and over time.
There is good reason to be sceptical about this.  While the OECD has put considerable effort into
standardizing measures of educational attainment (the ISCED definitions) the fact that these
definitions are continually being revised is an indication of the difficulty if not the impossibility
of the task.  The International Adult Literacy Survey (OECD, 1995) suggests large differences in
literacy levels across countries even among individuals with the same ISCED level of education.
In addition, the increase in educational attainment in most countries means that a high-school drop-
out today is likely to be at a rather different position in the ability distribution today compared to
25 years ago.  In this paper we try to achieve comparability across countries and over time by
focussing, not on the fortunes of individuals with a given level of education, but on the fortunes of
those at a given position in the skills distribution.  This has the advantage that it is natural to
compare an individual at a given percentile in the skills distribution in one country with someone
at the same position in another.  Of course, published statistics do not come in this form and one
of the contributions of the paper is to show how one can (with certain assumptions) use data on
labour market performance by levels of education to make inferences about the performance at
different points in the skills distribution.   
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we present the basic framework
and show how it is the gap between the demand for skills and the supply of skills that is important
1 In the discussion at the end of the paper we raise the possibility that the labour market is
monopsonistic.  In this case the labour demand curve in (2) needs to be augmented by a term
which is related to the elasticity of labour supply to firms (a measure of monopsony power).  The
important point is that a shift in relative demand against a particular sort of labour is
observationally indistinguishable from an increase in monopsony power. 
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Y(t) ' A(t).exp ma(h,t)logN(h,t)dh (1)
logW(h,t) ' loga(h,t) % logY(t) & logN(h,t)
' loga(h,t) % logW(t) % logN(t) & logN(h,t)
(2)
a(h,t) ' f (h&µa t) (3)
for labour market performance and proposes a one-dimensional measure of skill mismatch.  The
second section then shows that, under reasonable assumptions, an increase in this measure of skill
mismatch would be expected to be associated with some combination of rising wage inequality
and higher unemployment.  The third section then shows how this index of skill mismatch can be
estimated and the fourth and fifth sections contain empirical evidence on the extent of skill
mismatch in six countries.  We conclude that there is no evidence of an increase in skill mismatch
in the continental European countries but there is evidence of an increase in the US and UK.  The
sixth section then shows that the measured increase in skill mismatch in the US and the UK is of
a magnitude sufficient to explain the rise in wage inequality in these countries. 
   
1. The Theoretical Model: Labour Demand
Let us assume that there is a single index of skill (or human capital) denoted by h (an approach that
is also taken by Card and Lemieux (1996) though their use of the assumption is very different from
ours).   Suppose the production function is given by the following version of a Cobb-Douglas (we
will discuss briefly below the consequences of having a more general specification of the
production function):
where N(h,t) is the employment at date t of those with human capital h.  This should be thought of
as a long-run ‘reduced form’ production function after one has concentrated out the profit-
maximising choice of other inputs so it makes sense to assume that there are constant returns in
labour.  Assuming that the labour market is perfectly competitive, (1) then leads to the following
familiar labour demand curve1:
where variables without h arguments denote aggregate variables.  The restrictions on a(h,t) are that
the integral with respect to h should sum to one so that density functions are a useful source of
possible functions for a(h,t). To keep matters simple (although much of what follows can be done
more generally) let us suppose that a(h,t) has the following form:
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logW(F,t) & logW(t) ' logf (µst&µa t%s hF
&1(F)) & logf (F &1(F))
% logs h & log(1&u(F,t)) % log(1&u(t))
(7)
m
1
o
a(h(F,t),t)
ß(h(F,t),t)
dF'm
%4
&4
a(h,t)
ß(h,t)
ß(h,t)dh'm
%4
&4
a(h,t)dh'1 (8)
h(F,t) ' µst % s hF
&1(F) (6)
where f (.) is the standard normal distribution.  The assumption that the ‘variance’ of this
distribution is one is simply a normalisation which scales the units of h.  This specification implies
that at each moment in time there is a ‘most desired’ level of skill which possibly changes over
time.  It implies, for example, that the demand for brain surgeons is extremely low when
development is low as no-one has the other requisite technology to allow them to do their job but
that the demand will rise through time as technology advances and then, if we push further on, will
then decay again as their skills become superceded by technology.  
(2) is written in terms of a given level of skill, h.  But, as we described in the introduction,
we are interested in what is happening to someone at a given position in the skills distribution
which we will denote by F.  To say, anything about this we need to bring in the supply of skills.
We will assume that the distribution of h in the population is given by:
An increase in educational attainment will be represented in this framework by an increase in µst:
we will not attempt to model the supply of skills to the economy though any complete model of the
economy obviously should do so.  Let us use ß(h,t) to denote the density of the population with
skills h at time t.  We can then write the labour demand curve (2) as:
where u(h,t) is the unemployment rate of those with skills h and u(t) is the aggregate unemployment
rate.  But (5) is written in terms of a given level of skill and we want to write this equation in
terms of a given position in the skills distribution.  Given (4), we have that:
 which can be used, together with (5) and (3) to derive:
where F  is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution.  (7) can be thought of as
presenting a trade-off for workers at position F between their log relative wage and their log
relative employment rate.  The slope of this trade-off is -1 from the Cobb-Douglas assumption and
the first-terms on the right-hand side of (7) determine the position of this trade-off so can be
thought of as an index of relative demand for the person at position F. Let us denote this relative
demand index by log D(F,t).  It is worth noting that this demand index must integrate to one so that
it makes sense to talk about it as a relative demand index: to see this note that from (5) it is (a/ß)
which is the relative demand index and that:
2   The case where s h1 is more complicated as then the densities for demand and supply
do not have the same variance.  In this case the relative demand index will not be monotonic in F
which makes things intuitively more difficult and also might cause one to wonder about the
suitability of the model. 
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where the first equality follows by changing the variable of integration from F to h.  How this
relative demand index varies with F depends on s h and (µat-µst) which we will denote by µt. The
case s h=1 is particularly simple and, as we shall see later, also seems to have some empirical
relevance2.  Then the demand index reduces to:
so that relative demand is increasing (decreasing) in human capital as µt$(#)0 which can be
interpreted as the demand for skills running ahead or behind the supply of skills.  If we were in the
situation where relative demand was decreasing in human capital we would expect there to be low
or even negative returns to education so that investment would decrease, reducing µst and bringing
us back towards the case where µt$0.  So, we might expect that the economically relevant case is
where µt$0 and our estimates below will suggest very strongly that this is the case.
Notice also that the position of the relative demand curve for a person at a given position
in the skills distribution depends on µt i.e. on the gap between the demand and the supply for skills.
If µst increases over time (as a result of increasing educational attainment) and µat increases over
time (as a result of skill-biassed change) but the gap between them remains the same so that µt
remains constant then (7) tells us that the everyone’s relative labour demand curve will remain in
the same position and there would be no reason to think that there would be increases in wage
inequality and/or unemployment.    This makes perfect sense.  In spite of the fact that it is a
question one often hears raised, it does not make much sense to ask whether there have been any
shifts in relative demand against the less-skilled as there probably have been ever since the
industrial revolution began (see Goldin and Katz (1996) for evidence relating to the beginning of
this century).  More pertinent is the question whether the shifts in relative demand for skilled
labour have been matched by equivalent changes in relative supply.
Now consider what is likely to happen if the demand for skills increases faster than the
supply so that µt increases.  By differentiating (7) one can see that such a change will improve the
position of the relative demand curve for those at the top of the skills distribution and reduce it for
those at the bottom.  Again, this makes intuitive sense.  This discussion suggests using µt/(µat-µst)
as our index of skill mismatch, an index which is particularly simple.  So, if we can figure out a
way of estimating µt then we can examine the way it changes over time to consider whether there
have been any changes in skill mismatch: we show how to do this below.
One way of thinking about (9) is that the relative demand index D(F,t) is a measure of the
economic opportunity facing people at a given position in the skills distribution which may be
‘taken’ in the form of higher relative wages or relative employment or both (see (5)).  (7) says that
the relative demand index is log-normally distributed over the skills distribution with mean equal
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to one and variance equal to the square of the mismatch index.  So the mismatch index is related
to how economic opportunity varies across the skill distribution.  
Nothing we have done so far allows us to say what will be the effect of changes in skill
mismatch on the aggregate unemployment rate and we cannot say anything about this without
discussing the process of wage determination.  So, it is to this that we turn next.
2. The Theoretical Model: Wage Determination
In this section we will work with a generic ‘wage curve’ and we will not go too far into the
microfoundations for it although one can justify the type of set-up we are going to use in a
bargaining model or an efficiency wage model.  The previous discussion showed that if µt is
constant then the relative labour demand curves do not shift and there is no need for any change
in wage inequality or relative employment rates.  But, a constant µt is only a necessary condition
for there to be no change: whether there is any change depends on the process of wage
determination.  If we restrict our attention to wage curves in which wages depend only on the own
unemployment rate then, for no changes in wage inequality and unemployment rates to occur, it is
simple to see that the wage curve must be of the following form:
so that it is relative wages that are related to unemployment.  As we do not want to rule out the
possibility of neutral change we will assume that the wage curve is of this form.  One way of
thinking about this assumption is that it implies that the reservation wage of unemployed workers
is indexed to average wages e.g. because unemployment benefits are indexed in this way or
because wealth effects or support from other family members tie the living standards of the
unemployed to the average wage: these seem quite plausible arguments (indeed, Gregg and
Manning (1997) go further and argue that something like this assumption is necessary to explain
the economic history of unemployment and the wage structure).
With this wage curve one could, in principle, solve for the unemployment rates and wage
structure (we will do something along these lines below).  But, here, we are interested in a more
limited question: when will increases in skill mismatch lead to increases in aggregate
unemployment and/or wage inequality?  The following result provides sufficient conditions for this
to be the case.
Result 1: 
a. If we define µ=µa-µs, then:
where:
6? (u,F) / ?u(u,F)%
1
1&u
(12)
b.  If µ$0, u’(F)#0, ?u$0, ?uu$0,  ?uF#0, then an increase in skill mismatch will lead to a rise
in the aggregate unemployment rate and an increase in wage inequality.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The sufficient conditions provided in this result are all reasonable.  Our estimates below do
suggest that demand does run ahead of supply.  The correlation of unemployment rates with
education strongly suggests that individuals with more human capital have lower unemployment
rates.  All the studies of wage curves (notably Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) suggest that log
wages are a convex function of the unemployment rate.  Finally, what evidence there is suggests
that wages are less responsive to unemployment for those with higher education.  So, it does seem
reasonable to believe that an increase in skill mismatch could be partially or wholly responsible
for the rise in unemployment.  
(11) also illustrates the obvious point that the impact of skill mismatch on unemployment
depends on how sensitive are relative wages to unemployment.  In the extreme case where we
have complete flexibility ?u=4 and one can then readily check that skill mismatch has no effect on
aggregate unemployment though there will be a large impact on wage inequality.  On the other hand
if ?u is close to 0 then the wage distribution will not change but there will be a large effect on
unemployment.
So far, the analysis has been entirely theoretical.  So, while it has shown that there are
reasons for thinking that an increase in skill mismatch could have caused a deterioration in labour
market performance it has not provided any evidence that such an increase in skill mismatch has
occurred: this is the subject of the next section.
3. The Data
In this section we investigate the adequacy of this framework and the evidence for the existence
and extent of skill mismatch.  The theory of the previous sections has all been in terms  of human
capital and this is a potential source of problems as we do not observe human capital directly.
But, we will show below that one can still make progress even if one only has a variable that is
correlated with human capital.  For this paper we have used education as the appropriate variable
as this is what the other papers in the area have most commonly used and it is readily available.
We have data for six countries: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and the
US.  This selection was determined by availability of the relevant data more than anything else but
they obviously capture an important sub-set of the OECD countries encompassing a wide range
of experiences.  For each country we have in each year data on employment, unemployment and
wages for four education groups.  Details of the data sources are provided in the Appendix.  While
the definitions of educational attainment are meant to be more or less comparable one can see from
Figure 1 that the proportions in the different categories vary a great deal across countries: this
should make us wary of comparisons of unemployment rates and wages based on allegedly
3 It is worth noting that the OECD quantitative literacy test suggests that allegedly identical
levels of education reflect very different levels of literacy in different countries (OECD, 1995).
4 Most studies in this area implicitly assume that schooling and human capital are perfectly
correlated.  This has the implication that the lowest wage for people with a certain level of
schooling will be above the highest level of wages for someone with a lower level of schooling,
an assumption that is violated in the data.  Introducing the ability component ensures that there is
some overlap in the human capital distributions for people with different levels of education and
also allows us to consider how sensitive are our results to the assumed correlation between
schooling and human capital.
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consistent educational definitions3.  For most of the countries one can see clear evidence of
increasing educational attainment.  Figure 2 presents the information on the evolution of the wage
bill shares showing once again the increase in the shares of the more educated groups.  Wage bill
shares obviously combine information on labour force shares, relative employment rates and
relative wages so Figures 3 and 4 present the data for the evolution of relative employment rates
and relative wages. The trends are perhaps not particularly easy to see in these Figures so Table
1 presents estimates of the ten-year trend in relative employment and wages.  This confirms that
most (though not all) of the European countries show evidence of deterioration in the relative
employment of the least-skilled whereas it is in relative wages that the trends are most marked in
the US and the UK (a trend that has been documented elsewhere  e.g. Katz and Murphy, 1992;
Schmitt, 1995).  It is worth noting that it is possible for changes in relative wages or employment
rates to have the same sign for all education groups: this signals the importance of the changing
education composition of the labour force. 
Now let us consider how we can use this type of information to investigate the problems
caused by skill mismatch.
4. Empirical Evidence:  Measuring Skill Mismatch
In this section we show how we can estimate our index of skill mismatch, µt, to see whether or not
there has been an increase in skill mismatch.  For this purpose we are going to use information on
people with different levels of education.  We need to have a model of how human capital is
related to education.  We will assume that human capital is partly determined by schooling,
denoted by s (which we will assume to be a continuous variable), but also by ‘ability’, denoted
by e4 so that schooling is not perfectly correlated with skills.  Assume that the human capital of
individual i at date t is given by:
Assume that s and e are joint normally distributed with the following distribution:
8Ast ' F
(s&µst)%
?hss s
s h
(µst&µat)
s s 1&?
2
hs%
?2hs
s 2h
(15)
The assumption that ability has mean zero is simply a normalization that can be made without loss
of generality.  This specification allows for schooling to be correlated with ability (as is
sometimes claimed).  (13) and (14) obviously leads to (4) with s 2h= s 2s+ s 2e+2?s ss e.
In this model education is a continuous variable but in our data we obviously only have
discrete educational categories.  The way we deal with this is to assume that everyone in a
particular educational category in our data has a level of schooling between certain limits which
remain constant over time.  Effectively, we have an ordered probit model for educational
attainment.  
Now consider how we can use this information to measure skill mismatch.  Suppose that
we have divided the population into two education groups, high and low.  We will assume that all
those classed as high education have education above some level s.  We will show how
information on the share of the wage bill going to the low education group can be used  to infer
something about shifts in demand and supply.  Working out the relationship between the share of
the wage bill going to the low education group and these trends is not entirely straightforward as
the trend in demands is defined relative to h which is only imperfectly correlated with s.  But the
following result shows that, given the assumptions made, there is a simple expression for the share
of the wage bill going to those with education less than s (which is something we have data on).
Result 2: The share of the wage bill going to individuals with education less than s at date t, Ast,
is given by:
where ?hs is the correlation coefficient between h and s.
Proof: See Appendix A.
9(s&µst)%
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s&µst
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It is convenient to invert (15) to give:
Note that (16) implies that F -1(Ast) can be written as an education-specific constant which does
not vary over time and a time effect which does not vary across education groups which represents
a combination of the demand and supply trends. If one just has information on the evolution in the
share of the wage bill of two education groups over time one can use (16) to read off the trends
in supplies and demands up to a constant.  In this case, there is no test of the adequacy of the model
specification.  But if one has more than two education groups then one can estimate (16) as all
groups should have the same time effects.  How well this model fits the data is then a test of the
adequacy of the framework.  
So, one can use (16) and data on wage bill shares accruing to different education groups
over time to estimate some weighted combination of the demand and supply trends.  This has a
number of useful implications.  First, it shows how one can potentially use a variable like
schooling that is not perfectly correlated with human capital to investigate the existence of biassed
demand shocks.  This result can obviously also be applied to any other variable that is correlated,
albeit imperfectly, with the underlying measure of skill.  For example a number of studies (e.g.
Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994; Machin, 1995) investigate changes in the share of the wage
bill going to non-production workers.  None of these authors believe that white-collar status is the
crucial variable for understanding  skill-biassed technical change:  it is simply that this is the best
data available and it is plausibly correlated with human capital.  A result like the one reported
above provides some more formal justification for the procedure used in these papers.  But the
result also suggests some degree of caution in interpreting these results might be warranted.
Unless the variable under investigation is perfectly correlated with the human capital variable
supply trends as well as demand trends appear in (16) so that the estimated trend will be a linear
combination of supply and demand shifts and it is something of an act of faith assuming that
increases in the share of the wage bill going to non-production workers is primarily indicative of
pure demand shifts.  To go to the other extreme, suppose that schooling is uncorrelated with human
capital.  We will then estimate only the supply shifts from estimating an equation like (16) and
investigation of the evolution of wage bill shares can tell us nothing about demand shifts.  
But a bit more information can be used to enable us to estimate demand and supply trends.
Let us assume that we have data on the fraction of the population below education level s  which
we will denote by Bst which must satisfy the formula:
which can be inverted to give:
5 It does require the assumption that the level of schooling corresponding to a given
educational category in a country remains the same over time.
6 Though, we would expect that the efficiency of the estimate will be affected by the
educational categories used.
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Substituting (17) into (16) we have that:
so that information on wage bill shares and labour force shares can be used to estimate the
evolution of supply relative to demand.  Given more than two education groups one can use (19)
to estimate the coefficient on F -1(Bst) and also estimate the trends.  This also allows a test of the
adequacy of the specification of the model as the fit of this equation should be close to perfect if
the model is adequate.  A low fit would indicate that it is not just the means of the distribution that
is shifting over time and/or that the normal distribution is inappropriate.  
(19) has a particularly simple form if s h=1 as it then becomes:
Note that the wage bill shares and labour force shares that we use in these regressions are
cumulative ones.  As, by definition the cumulative shares of the highest education group must be
equal to one there is no useful information here so we only use the cumulative shares for the 3
lowest education groups in each year.  These inverse cumulative shares will, by construction, be
heteroscedastic and correlated within years.  While this does not affect the consistency of OLS
estimates, the standard errors must obviously take account of this fact. As we show in Appendix
B, we would expect the covariance matrix to be of a particular form and we exploit this in our
estimation method, which is feasible GLS. 
Table 2a gives the results of the model (19) for our sample countries.  Note that the
measure of skill mismatch derived from these estimates should be independent of the actual
educational categories used so does not rely on educational categories being the same for all
countries5 and should produce estimates that are comparable across countries and over time6.  This
is a big advantage of the proposed index and estimation method.
There are a number of aspects of these results worth noting.  First, the fit of the equation
is close to perfect for all countries implying that the data is consistent with the framework we have
described (though this should not be taken to mean that it might not also be consistent with other
assumptions about functional forms).  Secondly the coefficient on the inverse of the labour force
shares is very close to one for the US and Germany and slightly lower for the other European
7 Note that Result 2 does not apply exactly if we have a CES production function, a bad but
powerful reason for concentrating attention on a Cobb-Douglas production function.
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countries.  From (19) this implies that s h=1 for the US and that s h<1 for Europe (assuming, as
seems reasonable, that ?hs>0).  While this could be taken to imply that the distribution of human
capital is more compressed in Europe than the US, it would seem that (20) is a reasonable
approximation to the data.  This is extremely convenient as this case is much easier to understand
in intuitive terms and we will use it in what follows.  Given this, Table 2b estimates the model
imposing this restriction.
All the estimated intercepts in both tables are positive implying that demand is running
ahead of supply.  This simply says that the share of the wage bill going to high education groups
exceeds their share in the labour force because their wages are higher and their unemployment
rates are lower than the average. In terms of trends in skill mismatch, the UK and the US show
marked increases, France and Italy show a more modest increase in mismatch in the unrestricted
model but none in the restricted model, Germany shows no trend and the Netherlands actually
exhibits a decline.  Taken together, this suggests that there has been an increase in skill mismatch
in the Anglo-Saxon countries but none (or at most a more modest one) in Continental Europe. 
Our estimates are based on the assumption that a Cobb-Douglas is an adequate
representation of the production function.  While there are some estimates suggesting that this is
not a bad approximation (see Jackman et al, 1996; Manacorda and Petrongolo, 1998) one might
wonder how alternative assumptions would alter our results.  The natural generalisation is to a
CES technology.  This involves giving different weights to relative wages and relative employment
rates7.  As most estimates suggest more substitution between labour of different skills than Cobb-
Douglas would imply, we should give greater weight to relative wage changes.  For those
countries where the increase in mismatch shows up largely through a rise in wage inequality this
change would tend to increase measures of skill mismatch.  So, moving away from a Cobb-
Douglas production function would probably make the performance of the US and the UK look
even worse relative to the other European countries.
One might also be interested in how robust are our results to the statistical assumptions
made about the covariance structure of the errors.  Given that the fit of the model is close to
perfect, alternative specifications of the covariance structure will make hardly any difference to
the estimated coefficients but they could, conceivably, make a big difference to the standard errors
of the estimates.  Appendix B describes the way in which we allowed a more general covariance
structure: but the bottom line is that it makes no substantive difference to the estimates of mismatch
nor to the standard errors.    
It is tempting to use estimates like those reported in Table 2b to make comparisons of
trends in mismatch over time and within countries.  However such comparisons are made difficult
by the fact that it is not the mismatch index directly that is being estimated in Table 2 but ?hsµt.
Only if ?hs is constant over time or the same across countries can we use the estimates of Table 2
to infer anything about trends in skill mismatch.  But, nothing that we have done so far allows us
to estimate this parameter.  This is not a problem unique to our approach as most of the existing
literature ignores it by making the convenient but wrong assumption that human capital and
schooling are the same thing so that the correlation between them is perfect. 
We also might want to quantify the effect of the increase in skill mismatch on wage
inequality and unemployment i.e. to ask the question what would wage inequality and
unemployment rates have been if we had not observed the increase in skill mismatch.  To answer
8 Note that we positively do not want other variables in these regressions as our approach
has conditioned solely on education and all other variables are in the unexplained part of the skills
distribution.
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this type of question we also need knowledge of ?hs so that we can convert our estimates into the
parameters we need for (9).  So, let us consider how we can estimate the crucial parameter ?hs.
5. Empirical Evidence: The Correlation between Human Capital and
Schooling 
The results of the previous section provide an estimate of ?hsµ for each country for each year.  But
from the point of view of measuring skill mismatch it is really µ in which we are interested.  So,
if  we really want to compare indices of measures of skill mismatch across countries and over time
we need to have some estimate of ?hs.  This is the purpose of this section though we should
emphasize that there is a certain ‘back-of-the-envelope’ quality to what follows.
Suppose that wages can be represented by a linear function of human capital plus an error
term, e, according to the formula:
where ? should be thought of as the measurement error in our estimates of wages plus, more
generally, wage differentials that exist in reality that are not related to differences in human capital
(e.g. compensating wage differentials might fall into this category).  Suppose we run a regression
of log wages on schooling.  We can think of the R2 from this regression as being the fraction of the
variance in wages explained by human capital times the fraction of the variance of human capital
explained by schooling.  This latter variance is given by ?hs2 so that we have:
 or, re-arranging, we have that:
So, we can use information on the fraction of the variance of wages explained by education plus
the fraction of the variance of wages explained by human capital to estimate the correlation
between human capital and education.  Table 3 presents estimates of the square root of the
correlation coefficient, R, when an earnings function is estimated using only education as controls8.
We report two estimates, one based on the four educational categories used in the analysis above
and another based on as fine a decomposition as is available in our data sources.  For the formula
above, we would like to have education as a continuous variable so the grouping will mean that
9 It should be remembered that, for most countries, we are using weekly earnings not annual
earnings so that their results may not be strictly applicable to our data and we should think of the
number used here as a ‘best guess’.
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we are likely to underestimate R to some degree.  The extent of the under-estimate is likely to be
quite small given that even four categories seem to be able to do quite well in explaining wages
relative to the R2 for the equation with the larger number of educational categories.  Note that for
all countries the fraction of the variance in observed wages that can be explained by education
seems to be rising modestly through time.  There are two possible explanations for this:  either the
correlation of human capital with schooling is rising through time or the fraction of the variance
of wages that can be explained by human capital is rising.  This latter hypothesis might be
plausible for countries like the UK and the US where we know that the wage distribution is
widening if we thought that measurement error was approximately constant but is not particularly
plausible for the continental European countries.  The consequence of assuming that ?hs is
increasing is that the increase in skill mismatch comes to seem even more modest in these
countries.  This reinforces our earlier conclusion that these countries show no indication of any
increase in skill mismatch at all.
On the whole the fraction of the variance in earnings that can be explained by schooling
is surprisingly similar in all countries.  This would be consistent with the view that ?hs is similar
in all countries and differences in the estimates of Table 2 can be ascribed to differences in skill
mismatch suggesting that the problem is worse in the UK and US than in the other European
countries.
6. Can Skill Mismatch be Responsible for the Rise in Wage Inequality?
For countries other than the UK and the US there is obviously no point in assessing formally
whether skill mismatch can be held responsible for the rise in unemployment and/or wage
inequality for the simple reason that our estimates do not suggest that there has been any rise in
skill mismatch.  But, for the UK and the US we can try to get some idea as to the size of the
problems likely to be caused by the estimated increase in skill mismatch.  To do this we also need
an estimate of the second term in (23).  Let us be conservative and assume that the only variation
in wages not explained by human capital is measurement error.  Bound and Krueger (1991)
provide an estimate that 20% of the observed variance in annual earnings in the CPS is error9.  If
we use this estimate we need to multiply the estimates of R in Table 3 by 1.12 to get an estimate
of ?hs.  Note that this estimate is not very sensitive to changes in this proportion.  We then get an
estimate of the change in µ for the US from -0.68 in 1979 to -0.80 in 1991.  Turning to the UK,
assuming that the measurement error in wages is of a similar magnitude to that in the US (something
on which we have little information) the implied change in µ from 1979 to 1992 is from -0.47 to
-0.67, a change of 0.2. 
How can we get some idea of the likely impact of these changes?  From (7) we can work
out how the wage structure should change if relative employment rates were constant i.e. if all the
increases in mismatch went into increased wage inequality.  If this was the case, we would have:
10 Some notes of caution here.  First, the observed wage distribution includes the bit due
to measurement error that is not taken account of in these computations: this is likely to be small.
Second, the predicted wage distribution relates to the distribution among all individuals, the actual
data to that among workers in employment.  If, as seems likely, employment rates fall as we move
up the skills distribution, a given percentile in the employed wage distribution will be a higher
percentile in the skills distribution of the population as a whole.  However there is no guidance
about the direction of the impact of this effect on the change in wages relative to the median.
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We can use this to compare the change in wages at two positions in the wage distribution F0 and
F1 so that we have:
Figure 5 plots the actual change in wages relative to the median against the predicted change
assuming that all the rise in skill mismatch went into a rise in wage inequality and relative
employment rates were constant.  That is, it plots the left-hand side of (25) against the right-hand
side where F0=0.5.  The general impression for both the US and the UK is that the actual and
predicted changes are quite close though there is some deviation at the extremes of the
distribution10.  This suggests that the increase in skill mismatch is a potential explanation of the
rise in wage inequality in both countries.
How should we interpret these changes in the labour markets of the US, UK and
Continental Europe?  The most conventional explanation of the UK and US findings is that there
have been shifts in relative demand against the less-skilled.  Presumably the same shifts have been
occurring in Continental Europe so, if these countries show no evidence of increased skill
mismatch it seems likely that the response of the supply of skills has been greater in Continental
Europe.  However it is worth mentioning that there is another hypothesis that is equally consistent
with the data. 
Some recent research, notably DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), has suggested that the
declining importance of institutions like unions and the minimum wage played an important part
in explaining the rise in wage inequality in the United States.  The problem with this conclusion
in a conventional competitive model of the labour market is that one would then expect to see a
rise in the relative employment of the affected workers with no overall change in skill mismatch:
it is very hard to see this in the data.  However, if one was to follow the conclusions of
researchers like Card and Krueger (1995) into the impact of the minimum wage on employment
then one can reconcile the employment and wage movements.  Perhaps the simplest way to do this
in a framework similar to the one we have used in this paper is to assume that the labour market
is monopsonistic and that declines in minimum wages and unions made the labour market more
monopsonistic for less-skilled workers.  For the usual monopsony reasons such a change would
lead to a decline in relative wages and/or relative employment for the affected groups i.e. this
hypothesis is observationally indistinguishable from the hypothesis of relative demand shifts.  In
this situation, the lack of an increase in skill mismatch in the Continental European countries would
simply be the result of the fact that they have not had the institutional change in the labour market
experienced by the US and the UK.
Our evidence does suggest that the increase in skill mismatch as we have measured it is
of a magnitude sufficient to explain the rise in wage inequality in the US and the UK.  But, our
method cannot identify the reason for this increase in skill mismatch: we have argued that relative
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demand shifts and institutional change (combined with a non-competitive view of the labour
market) are equally consistent with the observed data.  And, because we have not found any
evidence of increased skill mismatch in many of the European countries, we have not shed any
light on the cause of high unemployment rates in these countries beyond suggesting that skill
mismatch is not a plausible explanation.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a conceptual framework for thinking about the labour market
consequences of changes in relative demand and skills of different skills.  We have proposed
comparing the fortunes of individuals at different positions in the skill distribution arguing that cuts
through the problem of assuming comparability of educational classifications across countries.
We have shown how one can use data on changes in labour force shares, employment rates,
relative wages and the wage structure to provide a measure of the extent of skill mismatch in the
economy which is comparable across countries with different measures of educational attainment.
Using this technique we found an increase in skill mismatch in the US and the UK but not in the
other European countries.  So, while the continental countries have had large rises in
unemployment, one cannot blame this rise on a change in skill mismatch and one must look
elsewhere for explanations.  For the UK and the US, the estimated increase in skill mismatch does
seem to be of a magnitude capable of explaining the increase in wage inequality.  
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Appendix A
Proof of Result 1
Combining (10) with (7) we have that:
Let us consider the effect of a change in µ.  Differentiating (26) we have that:
Collecting terms we have that:
Let us define:
Now as u=Iu(F)dF, we have that:
Now as ? (u(F),F)>1/(1-u(F)) the term in square brackets must be positive so the sign of the effect
of a change in µ on the unemployment rate depends on the sign of the right-hand side of (30).  As
? >0 the term involving µ must be positive if µ>0.  Now IF -1(F)dF=0 so we have that:
Now F -1(F) is increasing in F and from (29) we have that:
which is positive under the assumptions made proving that increases in skill mismatch increase
unemployment. 
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The impact on wage inequality follows straightforwardly.  From the wage curve (10) we
can see that the unemployment rate and relative wages must go in opposite directions.  We know
that the increase in skill mismatch must improve the position of the relative labour demand curve
for those at the top of the skills distribution and worsen it for those at the bottom.  Hence  relative
wages must rise at the top of the skills distribution and fall at the bottom.
Proof of Result 2
Let us denote by as(s) the share of the wage bill going to workers with schooling s.  These workers
will have different levels of h: we know that the share of the wage bill going to workers  with
human capital h is given by a(h).  Of these workers a fraction f(s*h) have education s where f(s*h)
is the density of s conditional on h.  So, we must have:
From (13) and (14) we have that:
Putting (3) and (34) in (33) we have that:
Let us collect the exponential terms and try to find coefficients (d0,d1,d2) so that:
Equating coefficients we have that:
18
d0d1 ' µa %
?hss s
s h
s&µs 1&
?hss s
s h
s 2s(1&?
2
hs)
(38)
d2 % d
2
1 ' µ
2
a %
s&µs 1&
?hss s
s h
2
s 2s(1&?
2
hs)
(39)
d2 ' µ
2
a %
s&µs 1&
?hss s
s h
2
s 2s(1&?
2
hs)
&
s 2h(1&?
2
hs)
s 2h(1&?
2
hs)%?
2
hs
µa %
?hss s
s h
s&µs 1&
?hss s
s h
s 2s(1&?
2
hs)
2
'
'
?2hs
s 2h(1&?
2
hs)%?
2
hs
µ2a %
s 2h
s 2s(s
2
h(1&?
2
hs)%?
2
hs)
s&µs 1&
?hss s
s h
2
%
& 2
s h?hs
s s(s
2
h(1&?
2
hs)%?
2
hs)
s&µs 1&
?hss s
s h
µa '
'
?hs
s 2h(1&?
2
hs)%?
2
hs
µa &
s h
s s (s
2
h(1&?
2
hs)%?
2
hs)
s&µs 1&
?hss s
s h
2
'
'
s&µs%
?hss s
s h
(µs&µa)
s s 1&?
2
hs%
?2hs
s 2h
2
(40)
Now:
Putting these equations into (35), we have that:
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where the second line follows from the integral of a standard normal random variable. The final
expression is the expression for the density function of a normal random variable given in (15).
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Appendix B
The GLS Procedure
In the estimation of a regression like (19) or (20) there are good reasons to believe that the
individual observations will be both heteroscedastic and correlated across observations within
individual years.  We deal with this problem by assuming that, within time periods, the covariance
matrix of [F -1(A)-gF -1(B)] is of the form s 2O where g is the slope coefficient in equation (19) and
O is derived below.  We assume that the covariances between periods are all zero.  Our
estimation method is to use feasible GLS where our estimate of g in Table 2a is first derived from
OLS.  To derive O we obviously need the covariance matrices of A and B and the covariance
between them.
The Covariance Matrix for B
Let dij be an indicator variable which takes value one if the educational level of individual
i is less than j.  Then: 
so that:
Using hats on variables to denote sample estimates, this implies that:
where L is labour force. Under the assumption of independence of the dij’s across individuals, it
follows that:
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Variance of A
Let aij be the share of the total wage bill of those with education less than j that is earned by
individual i.  We have that:
where Fi is the position of individual i in the earnings distribution of those with education less than
j and wj(Fi) is the wage associated with position i among those with education less than j.  Note
aij will be zero if individual i has education more than j.  Then: 
Now our estimate of Aj can be written as:
Using the previous results we have that:
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The Covariance between A and B
We are now in a position to estimate the variance of the estimator.
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Generalising the Covariance Matrix
For simplicity, let us consider the restricted regression model, where sh=1.
The model can be written in the stacked form over the different educational groups as
where e is a (3,1) vector of ones, b=?hsm and
We assume that the random disturbance term ut is normally distributed with zero mean, zero
autocorrelation but with some possible cross-correlation whose structure is not (necessarily)
constant over time. Let us denote the covariance matrix of ut by s 2Ot where Ot is the matrix derived
earlier in this appendix.  Now, it is well-known that we can find a Pt such that
so that we can transform the model to:
where: 
Under our assumptions the error term has a diagonal variance covariance matrix
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Our GLS procedure essentially estimates (61).  Now consider the alternative, unrestricted,
hypothesis that: 
where C is some matrix (not necessarily an identity matrix).  The log likelihood of the unrestricted
model can be written
while for the restricted model
A log likelihood ratio test of our assumption about the covariance matrix of vt against the
alternative of (66) is then of the form: 
where U and R denote respectively maximum likelihood estimates of the unrestricted and the
restricted model.  Under H0, the log-likelihood ratio is distributed as a chi-square with a number
of degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions.  A completely unrestricted specification
of C cannot be estimated, but we can estimate generalisations of our basic model and test our basic
model against them.  In doing this we are interested not just in whether we can reject our restricted
model but whether the estimates from the unrestricted model have different estimates of the extent
of mismatch and different standard errors.  In all the specifications we tried, no substantive
difference in the results were found.
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Data Appendix
For each country we divide the labour force into four education groups.  For each of these groups
we collected data on the share of the labour force in each group, the unemployment rate and wages.
Sources and definitions are listed for each country.
France: Data come from Enquete Emploi, 1982-1993.  The four groups are:  up to primary
school  (cep, be, beps), junior high school (cap, bep), high school (bac or
equivalent), university education.  
Germany: Data come from the German Socio Economic Panel, 1984-1994.  The four groups
are:  without vocational qualification, with vocational qualification, with
apprenticeship, with university education.  The wage variable is monthly income
form labour.  Data are weighted by cross-sectional weights.
Italy: Data on wages come from the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and
Wealth for the years 1977-1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991.  Data on employment
and  unemployment come from the Annuario statistico italiano, ISTAT, various
issues.  The four groups are:  up to primary school, junior high school, high school
and university degree or above.  Wages are defined as take home annual pay.
Wage data presented are weighted by the population weights.
Netherlands: Employment data come from Arbeidskrachtetentelling for the period  1979-1985
and from Enquete Beroepssbevolking for the period 1990-1993.  Wage data come
from Tijdreeksee Arbeidsrekeningen.  The four groups are:  up to primary school,
junior high school, high school and university degree or above.  Earning concept:
gross monthly wages.
UK: Data come from the General Household Survey for 1974-92.  The four groups are:
those with no qualifications, those with O-levels or equivalent qualification, those
with A-levels or equivalent qualification and university graduates.  The wage
variable is weekly earnings.
US: Data come from the Current Population Survey.  Data for the period 1973-1978 are
derived from the May Annual Files, while data for the period 1979-1991 come
from the Outgoing Rotation Group.  The four groups are high-school drop-outs,
high-school graduates, those with 2 years of college and those with 4 or more
years of college.  The wage variable is weekly earnings. Since data on earnings
are top coded in the CPS we estimate a tobit model of log earings on experience,
experience square, four education dummies, a sex dummy, a race dummy, 50 state
dummies, a part-time dummy, a dummy for married individuals.  Based on the
estimated standard deviation of residuals from this tobit regression we then
construct an uncensored normal distribution and impute wages for top coded
observations on the assumption of a log normal distribution of wages. Wage data
are weighted by the earning weights.
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Table 1
Trends in Relative Employment and Wages by Education
Education Category
1 2 3 4
Relative Employment Rate
France -.024 .010 .006 .022
Germany -.016 .013 -.009 -.001
Italy .008 .006 .031 .056
Netherlands -.017 -.010 -.020 .026
UK -.023 -.001 .003 .017
US -.023 -.005 .005 -.001
Relative Wages
France -.048 -.027 -.112 -.088
Germany .007 .001 -.083 -.071
Italy -.020 -.052 -.055 -.075
Netherlands .009 .016 -.102 -.119
UK -.089 -.085 -.104 .013
US -.113 -.079 -.048 .033
Notes: The numbers refer to the estimate 10-year trend in the relevant variable.
Table 2a
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GLS Estimates of Shifts in Demand Relative to Supply:  Unrestricted Model
country France Germany Italy Netherlands UK US
F -1(B) .894
(.005)
.991
(.008)
.933
(.003)
.970
(.008)
.912
(.011)
1.001
(.004)
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
.203
(.002)
.198
(.002)
.204
(.002)
.206
(.002)
.212
(.002)
.215
(.002)
.227
(.002)
.237
(.002)
.248
(.003)
.245
(.003)
.254
(.003)
.213
(.008)
.244
(.010)
.230
(.009)
.242
(.011)
.262
(.011)
.224
(.010)
.256
(.010)
.238
(.009)
.232
(.009)
.212
(.010)
.212
(.011)
.050
(.002)
.072
(.003)
051
(.003)
.073
(.003)
.061
(.002)
.066
(.002)
.064
(.002)
.084
(.002)
.091
(.002)
.093
(.002)
.089
(.002)
.093
(.002)
.270
(.024)
.262
(.024)
.276
(.025)
.251
(.026)
.220
(.026)
.215
(.026)
.197
(.026)
.207
(.027)
.191
(.019)
.189
(.017)
.207
(.017)
.223
(.016)
.207
(.017)
.210
(.017)
.230
(.020)
.264
(.019)
.233
(.021)
.278
(.021)
.300
(.023)
.308
(.027)
.315
(.022)
.327
(.022)
.329
(.022)
.350
(.022)
.356
(.023)
.359
(.022)
.347
(.023)
.226
(.027)
.227
(.027)
.259
(.028)
.247
(.028)
.241
(.026)
.246
(.026)
.229
(.014)
.237
(.013)
.247
(.014)
.278
(.014)
.286
(.014)
.285
(.014)
.300
(.014)
.309
(.013)
.314
(.013)
..311
(.014)
.310
(.013)
.323
(.013)
.329
(.013)
R2 0.9999 0.9997 0.9999 0.9988 0.9980 0.9994
No. of Observations 33 33 36 24 57 57
Table 2b
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GLS Estimates of Shifts in Demand Relative to Supply: Restricted Model
country France Germany Italy Netherlands UK US
F -1(B) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
.211
(.010)
.204
(.010)
.205
(.010)
.202
(.011)
.205
(.010)
.207
(.011)
.212
(.012)
.217
(.012)
.225
(.013)
.217
(.014)
.223
(.013)
.210
(.009)
.241
(.010)
.223
(.009)
.239
(.010)
.255
(.010)
.220
(.010)
.252
(.009)
.234
(.009)
.228
(.009)
.208
(.009)
.207
(.010)
.059
(.019)
.076
(.015)
.051
(.016)
.069
(.012)
.053
(.010)
.054
(.014)
.049
(.014)
.065
(.013)
.065
(.011)
.062
(.012)
.052
(.011)
.048
(.011)
.251
(.033)
.251
(.033)
.264
(.035)
.238
(.035)
.208
(.035)
.200
(.035)
.181
(.035)
.191
(.036)
.206
(.030)
.198
(027)
.213
(.027)
.225
(.026)
.205
(.027)
.208
(.028)
.224
(.032)
.256
(.030)
.222
(.031)
.257
(.033)
.273
(.033)
.289
(043)
.279
(.034)
.294
(.035)
.293
(.035)
.312
(.035)
.317
(.037)
.319
(.034)
.303
(.036)
.226
(.026)
.228
(.027)
.260
(.027)
.247
(.027)
.242
(.026)
.246
(.026)
.230
(.014)
.238
(.013)
.248
(.013)
.279
(.014)
.286
(.014)
.285
(.014)
.301
(.013)
.309
(.013)
.314
(.013)
.311
(.013)
.310
(.013)
.324
(.013)
.330
(.013)
R2 .9988 .9997 .9995 .9975 .9948 .9826
No. of Observations 33 33 36 24 57 57
Table 3
R from a Regression of Log Wages on Education
29
country Germany Italy UK US
1973 .32 .34
1974 .30 .35 .33 .35
1975 .30 .34 .34 .36
1976 .32 .36 .34 .36
1977 .28 .29 .36 .40 .32 .35
1978 .25 .26 .35 .40 .34 .36
1979 .25 .26 .35 .39 .32 .34
1980 .26 .28 .35 .39 .33 .35
1981 .21 .22 .37 .41 .33 .35
1982 .26 .26 .38 .42 .34 .36
1983 .29 .30 .35 .39 .35 .37
1984 .34 .38 .31 .31 .36 .40 .33 .35
1985 .38 .40 .35 .41 .34 .36
1986 .38 .39 .31 .32 .36 .41 .35 .36
1987 .42 .44 .31 .31 .39 .42 .36 .37
1988 .45 .46 .35 .40 .35 .37
1989 .38 .40 .33 .34 .37 .42 .40 .41
1990 .41 .42 .38 .42 .40 .41
1991 .39 .42 .31 .31 .39 .42 .40 .41
1992 .50 .53 .39 .43
1993 .52 .56 .32 .33
1994 .48 .52
Notes:    1. There are no results for France or the Netherlands because we do not have
access to micro data for these countries.           
Figure 1
Labour Force Shares by Education
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Figure 2
Wage Bill Shares by Education
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Figure 3
Relative Employment Rates by Education
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Graphs by country
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Figure 4
Relative Wages by Education
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Figure 5
Predicted and Actual Rises in Wage Inequality
United States
United Kingdom
Notes: 1. The actual
change is the change in the log wage at different percentiles relative to the log
median over the period 1979-91 for the US and 1979-92 for the UK.
2. The predicted change is what would be obtained using the formula in equation
(23).
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